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Abstract
The payment of zakat by the owners of wealth is one of the ve pillars
of Islam. Many countries operate with no enforcement of the obligation
to pay, making zakat a form of voluntary redistribution. We analyze how
zakat a¤ects capital accumulation in a model that explicitly recognizes
the voluntary nature of zakat. The voluntary payment is modelled using
both warm-glow and social custom frameworks. These are embedded
within an overlapping generations model with heterogenous consumers
and endogenous population growth. The results show that zakat can raise
the capital-labor ratio when it is motivated by the warm-glow but welfare
can be non-monotonic in the strength of the warm-glow. In the social
custom model reduced participation can lead to a reduced capital-labor
ratio as the rate of zakat is increased.
JEL classication codes: E62, H21, P51
Acknowledgements: Thanks are due to Ted Bergstrom, Nigar Hashimzade,
seminar participants in Exeter, participants in the Singapore conference on
Leadership, Altruism, and Social Organization, and the Associate Editor and
referee.
Corresponding author. Address: Department of Economics, Streatham Court, Rennes
Drive, Exeter EX4 4PU, United Kingdom. E-mail: G.D.Myles@exeter.ac.uk
1
1 Introduction
Paying zakat is one of the ve pillars of Islam stated in the Koran. The payment
of zakat is a religious obligation and must be fullled by Muslims who own wealth
above the minimum threshold. Al-Qardawi (1997) argues that zakat is not just
a form of worship but also that the receipt of the proceeds of zakat is a right of
the poor. There are two types of zakat: zakat-al-tr and zakat-al-mal. Zakat-al-
tr must be paid for charity at the end of Ramadhan (Zayas, 1960). We focus
on zakat-al-mal which is the zakat on wealth. This is levied on di¤erent types
of wealth at a benchmark rate of 2.5 percent. Zakat on wealth must be paid
by Muslims who own wealth above the nisab, the minimum exemption limit,
and must be paid annually. The goal of zakat is to redistribute wealth from the
owners of nisab (the non-poor) to the non-owners of nisab (the poor).
The institution of zakat can be viewed as a system of voluntary redistribution
supported by religious obligation. It represents an alternative institutional form
to redistribution through statutory taxes and transfers. Interesting questions
are therefore raised concerning the economic consequences of this institution.
There have been several studies of the economic e¤ect of zakat (Siddiqi 1979,
Rahman 2003, Kuran 2006). Most Islamic economists argue that zakat has a
positive e¤ect on the economy. It is generally concluded that the e¤ect of the
implementation of zakat is to increase aggregate demand, increase the capital
stock, and raise economic growth. There are two separate arguments underlying
these claims. The rst observes that zakat is a transfer of wealth from the rich to
the poor, so if the poor have a higher marginal propensity to consume than the
rich then aggregate demand will rise. The second is the claim that zakat payers
will increase their saving ratio in order to avoid the depletion of wealth due to
the payment of zakat. Embedding these arguments within a static Keynesian
model leads to the conclusion that the increase in saving will ultimately be
matched by an increase in investment (Kahf 1980, Khan 1984). The level of
output therefore rises in equilibrium. Some of the limitations of this reasoning
are identied by Iqbal (1985) who observed that the consumptions e¤ects of
transfers of wealth from the rich to the poor could cancel unless a Keynesian
aggregate consumption function was assumed.
There are two further signicant limitations of this previous literature. First,
the models used are static so provide a poor framework for addressing the ef-
fects of zakat on capital accumulation and growth. In order to see the overall
e¤ects of zakat on an economys capital accumulation and consumption, it is
necessary to consider how the economy is a¤ected in the long run. Thus, we
choose to analyze zakat within an overlapping generations model in order to
derive long-run implications for capital accumulation. Second, the models do
not incorporate the motive for paying zakat within the analysis of consumption
and saving decisions. The economic representation of this motive has to be a
key component of the analysis.
The motivation for paying zakat is important because it is a religious oblig-
ation rather than a statutory duty. In other words, zakat is not a tax but is
instead a voluntary contribution to wealth redistribution. We consider two dif-
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ferent explanations for why such a voluntary contribution is made. The rst is to
model the reward from making the payment as a form of warm-glow (Andreoni,
1990). The alternative is to model the religious obligation behind contribu-
tions to zakat as a social custom. We discuss the relative merits of these two
approaches in more detail below. In our modelling we also assume that the
growth rate of population is endogenous. In particular, we assume the growth
rate of the poor population is dependent upon the income level of the poor.
This assumption can be motivated by the argument that both fertility and the
survival rates of infants are dependent on income. In any case, this mecha-
nism provides an interesting feedback from zakat to the dynamic evolution of
the economy. One of the arguments of Malthus against the English Poor Law
was that support for the poor was self-defeating: support raised the population
which, in turn, reduced the real wage. The process of zakat is di¤erent. Zakat is
provided out of wealth, so an increase in support for the poor is obtained from
greater wealth accumulation. Since this raises the stock of capital it does not
follow that the real wage must fall.
The analysis explores the economic consequences of the institution of zakat
employing standard economic models drawn from the literature on voluntary
contribution. The results demonstrate that the institution of zakat can increase
the capital-labor ratio in the model that we analyze if contribution is explained
by a warm-glow. The results for the social custom model are not so promising
for the institution. As the rate of zakat is increased the model predicts a fall in
the capital-labor ratio through decreased participation in the social custom.
Section 2 reviews the operation of zakat and the modelling of voluntary con-
tributions. Section 3 presents the overlapping generations economy we use to
study zakat and characterizes dynamic equilibrium and the steady-state. Sec-
tion 4 describes the di¤erent forms of preference we employ to explain voluntary
provision of zakat. The preferences are placed within the overlapping genera-
tions economy in Section 5 and a simulation analysis undertaken. Conclusions
are given in Section 6.
2 Operation and Modelling of Zakat
Zakat is not purely an act of worship. Apart from its religious objectives zakat
also has the socioeconomic objective of reducing inequality in the distribution
of wealth between the rich and the poor (Ahmad, 1980). The Koran permits a
zakat payment to be made directly to recipients or through a zakat collection
authority (Mannan, 1986). Both centralized (or obligatory) and decentralized
(or voluntary) modes of zakat administration are permitted. Malaysia, Saudi
Arabia, and Pakistan are among the countries where zakat is administered by the
state (Kuran, 2006). In many other countries the state is not directly involved.
Zakat payments on wealth are made on an annual basis. The forms of
wealth that are zakatable, and the ratios of zakat payment on each, were not
fully specied in the Koran. The rates of zakat payment, time of payment,
the nisab, and the method of organizing and administering zakat collection
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and distribution were adopted through the practice or sayings of the Prophet
Muhammad. According to Shaik (1979, cited by Zaman 1980) a majority of
Islamic jurists agree on the rates in Table 1 and the zakatable assets in Table 2.
Table 1: Rates of zakat
Item Rate
On all types of wealth 2.5%
Mines and treasure troves 20%
Produce from irrigated land 5%
Produce from unirrigated land 10%
Animals 1.5%-2.5%
Table 2: Types of zakatable assets, nisab, and rates
Types of wealth
or asset Nisab Rate
Gold 85 grams of gold 2.5% of the value
Silver 595 grams of silver 2.5% of the value
Cash in hand, stocks,
bonds, trading
goods, or any
other liquid asset
Amount equivalent to
85 grams of gold
2.5% of the value
Agricultural produce 653 kg per harvest
5% (irrigated land)
10% (non-irrigated land)
Product of mines Any amount 20% of the value
Islamic jurists have di¤erent opinions about which sources of wealth should
be subject to zakat. Kahf (1997) noted three qhi views, or opinions, on zakat
collection. The narrow opinion includes agricultural products, gold and silver
(except for personal use), trading goods, short-term net returns, and cash in
hand. This is the most agreed upon method of zakat calculation. The middle
opinion includes all types of assets listed in the narrow opinion plus earnings
on xed assets, as well as wages, salaries, and professional incomes. The latter
is controversial in relation to the zakatability of new forms of wealth. The
third opinion includes items under the narrow and middle opinions plus xed
assets, which are assets used to generate income. This would include assets
such as buildings, furniture, machinery, and containers. However, a majority
of contemporary scholars believe business xed assets should be exempt from
zakat.
The distribution of the proceeds of zakat is clearly targeted to eight zakat
recipients in the Koran. As mentioned in Surah 9 verses 58-60:
A collected sadaqa is for the poor, the destitute, those who collect
it, reconciling peoples hearts, freeing slaves, those in debt, spending
in the Way of Allah and wayfarers. . . .
Five of the eight eligible recipients of zakat proceeds are considered to fall
under the poor category (Al-Abdin, 1997): the poor, the destitute, slaves, those
in debt, and wayfarers.
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The question of whether zakat is a tax has been widely debated. Economists
such as Kahf (1999), Kamali (1999), and Kuran (2006) have referred to zakat
as a tax. Certainly, zakat shares with taxation the aim of achieving economic
and social objectives. Where they di¤er is that payment of tax is mandatory
whereas the payment of zakat is a religious obligation. It is important to observe
that there is limited evidence of state enforcement of zakat payment even where
legislation permits this. Hence, in most countries zakat is voluntary and is
made either directly to the poor or to a zakat collection authority. A further
di¤erence is that tax rates can be changed as part of scal policy whereas the
rate of zakat is xed through religious ruling. Finally, the recipients of the
proceeds of zakat are specically dened whereas hypothecation is rarely used
for taxation. However, zakat shares with taxation the property that it results
in the transfer of purchasing power from one economic agent to another. It
should therefore be possible to explore the economic e¤ects of zakat using the
same tools as applied to taxation provided that the motives for giving zakat are
adequately represented.
According to Chapra (1992), the payment of zakat should be voluntary but
with the state able to enforce payment if it wishes to do so. Since there are many
countries in which zakat is not enforced but the level of payment is signicant,
it is necessary to consider explanations of such voluntary giving. In doing this
we are seeking an economic representation of the religious motives that drive
the payment of zakat. Alexander et al. (1997) suggested that people give
because they expect gratitude and because of religious commitment. The two
representations we consider, the warm-glow and social custom models, can be
seen as formalizations of these explanations.
Andreoni (1989, 1990) motivated giving through the derivation of internal
satisfaction; this satisfaction has become known as the warm-glow. In the warm-
glow model the amount given is an argument of the utility function alongside
other consumption goods and is chosen as part of the utility maximization
process. In our context the warm-glow can be viewed as the pleasure derived
from fulllment of religious duties or from a more literal promise of future
reward. Examples of support for the latter interpretation can be found in Islamic
teaching:
Allahs Apostle said, "If one give in charity what equals one date-
fruit from the honestly-earned money and Allah accepts only the hon-
estly earned money  Allah takes it in His right (hand) and then
enlarges its reward for that person (who has given it), as anyone of
you brings up his baby horse, so much so that it becomes as big as a
mountain."1
As zakat is a religious obligation, we would expect failure to meet this to
result in a utility loss. This motivates our second way of modelling zakat. The
social custom model developed in Myles and Naylor (1996) captures the idea
that there is a loss of welfare if an accepted form of behavior is not followed.
1darulislam.info/Hadith_Bukhari-index-action-viewcat-cat-24.html
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In our model the accepted form of behavior is to meet religious obligations and
provide zakat. Hence, an owner of nisab who does not give zakat loses utility
from the social custom but can take advantage of higher disposable income. The
idea that there is a loss from breaking the social custom is made very clear:
Allahs Apostle said, "Whoever is made wealthy by Allah and does
not pay the Zakat of his wealth, then on the Day of Resurrection his
wealth will be made like a bald-headed poisonous male snake with two
black spots over the eyes. The snake will encircle his neck and bite
his cheeks and say, I am your wealth, I am your treasure."2
3 Economy
The debate in previous literature has focused upon how the institution of zakat
a¤ects capital accumulation and economic growth. To address these questions
we extend the standard overlapping generations model to incorporate two types
of consumer and include endogenous population growth. This section describes a
general version of the economy we consider. The general model encompasses the
special cases that arise when we specialize preferences to represent alternative
motives for providing zakat.
Each consumer lives for two periods and works only in the rst period of
life. In the second period of life each consumer is retired. Labor is supplied in-
elastically and is measured in e¢ ciency units. A rich consumer is able to supply
a greater number of e¢ ciency units of labor than a poor consumer. The labor
income of a rich consumer is divided between consumption and saving. In the
second period of life savings are divided between consumption and the payment
of zakat on accumulated wealth. A poor consumer receives labor income in the
rst period of life and payments of zakat in both periods. The poor do not
save, so all their income is consumed in the period in which it is received. It is
assumed that all the poor are identical (except for date of birth). The rich can
di¤er in the quantity of labor they are able to supply and in attitude toward
the payment of zakat.
A rich consumer born in period t is described by a vector of characteristics
: The elements of this vector are made precise in the di¤erent models of pref-
erences. Across the population of the rich  has a time-invariant distribution
f() with strictly positive support on  = [; ]. Hence,
Z 

f()d = 1. A
consumer with characteristics  has consumption level in the rst period of life
xrt;t () and in the second period x
r
t;t+1 () : Savings are denoted st () and labor
supply `r () : Savings at time t provide the wealth on which zakat is paid in
period t + 1. Zakat is a voluntary payment out of accumulated wealth so it is
always made in the second period of life. Hence, denote the zakat payment of a
rich consumer born in t by zt+1 ().
2darulislam.info/Hadith_Bukhari-index-action-viewcat-cat-24.html
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A poor consumer born in period t works in the rst period of life and earns la-
bor income `pwt. They receive a payment of zakat, t. The sum of labor income
and zakat is assumed to be insu¢ cient to nance saving; hence, consumption in
the rst period of life is
xpt;t = `
pwt + t: (1)
In the second period of life each poor consumer receives a payment of zakat,
t+1. Consumption in the second period of life is
xpt;t+1 = t+1: (2)
At the beginning of each period a new generation consisting of poor and rich
consumers is born. At time t the number of rich consumers born is Nrt and
the number of poor consumers is Npt . The population growth rate of the rich
is denoted nr and the population growth of the poor is npt . The value of n
r is
exogenous and constant, but npt is endogenous. The dynamics of population for
the two groups are given by
Nrt+1 = (1 + n
r)Nrt ; (3)
and
Npt+1 = (1 + n
p
t )N
p
t : (4)
We assume that zakat is paid equally to both young and old poor. A
more sophisticated structure could be assumed but would be unlikely to sig-
nicantly alter the results.3 We also assume, as is standard in tax models,
that there is no administrative cost in collecting or distributing zakat. Let
Zt = N
r
t 1
Z 

zt()f()d be the total contributed in zakat in period t: By
construction, the zakat received at time t by each member of the poor is given
by
t =
Zt
Npt +N
p
t 1
: (5)
We adopt a Malthusian model of population growth for the poor under which
the growth rate, npt ; is determined by fertility and survival. We assume that
these are related to the level of rst-period income which is the sum of labor
income plus the amount of zakat received. Since zakat is distributed evenly
among the poor it can be assumed that
npt =

1
v

(t + `
pwt)  1; (6)
where the factor v can be given the interpretation of the income required to
ensure that the survival rate is just high enough to keep the number of poor
constant.
3 It can be seen that equal division gives the young poor greater income in total than the
old poor. This may seem to favor the young, until it is observed that the young are raising
children so have greater needs than the old.
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It is assumed the rms in the economy are competitive and all produce with
the same constant returns to scale technology. Let Kt be the capital stock in
period t and Lt be aggregate supply of e¢ ciency units of labor. Dening the
per capita variables yt = YtLt and kt =
Kt
Lt
; it follows that yt = f (kt) : The
prot-maximizing use of inputs determines the factor rewards
f (kt)  ktf 0 (kt) = wt; (7)
and
f 0 (kt) = rt: (8)
The equilibrium of an overlapping generations economy can be interpreted
either as the time path of the endogenous variables or as the steady state in
which all per capita variables are constant. We nd it worthwhile to consider
both of these concepts in what follows. In this model equilibrium can be ex-
pressed in terms of two state variables: the capital-labor ratio and the ratio of
poor to rich in the population. The time path of the endogenous variables is
described by a pair of non-linear di¤erence equations that determines the tran-
sition of the state variables from one period to the next. The steady state is
obtained by determining the xed point of these non-linear di¤erence equations.
Equilibrium in the capital market is achieved when capital demand in t+1 is
equal to saving in t. Since it is only the rich that save this equilibrium condition
can be written
Kt+1 =Wt  Xrt;t; (9)
where Wt = Nrt
Z 

wt`
r () f () d and Xrt;t = N
r
t
Z 

xrt;t () f () d: The to-
tal quantity of labor in period t+ 1 is
Lt+1 = N
r
t
Z 

`r () f () d +Npt+1`
p: (10)
Combining (9) and (10) equilibrium in the capital market can be expressed in
term of the capital-labor ratio as
kt+1 =
Nrt
Z

wt`
r () f () d  Nrt
Z

xrt;t () f () d
Nrt+1
Z

`r () f () d +Npt+1`
p
: (11)
Now dene the proportion of poor to rich at time t by t  N
p
t
Nrt
and use (5) and
(6) to obtain
kt+1 =
wt`
r   xrt;t
[1 + nr] `
r
+ `
pt
v
h
zt
[1+nr]t+t 1
+ `pwt
i ; (12)
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where a bar denotes the mean of the variable. Equation (12) is the non-linear
di¤erence equation that updates the capital stock from t to t+1: The signicant
di¤erence to the standard overlapping generations model is that this equation
also involves the endogenous variable t and the value of the capital stock from
t  1.
A second non-linear di¤erence equation now has to be obtained to describe
the time path of t. This is derived by taking the time path of the number of
poor consumers relative to the number of rich consumers
Npt+1
Nrt+1
=
[1 + npt ]
[1 + nr]
Npt
Nrt
: (13)
Using (5), and (6), this can be written
t+1 =
1
v [1 + nr]

zt
[1 + nr] t + t 1
+ `pwt

t: (14)
The pair of equations (12) and (14) constitute the system of non-linear di¤erence
equations that determine the time paths of the endogenous variables fktg and
ftg. Given fktg the time time paths of the factor prices are obtained from
(7) and (8). Finally, consumption demands and zakat provision follow from the
individual consumer decisions.
The steady state is achieved when all per capita variables are constant. In
addition, the growth rate of the poor population must be equal to the growth
rate of the rich population. If this were not the case then one population group
would eventually become insignicant in size relative to the other. The steady
state is a pair fk; g that simultaneously solve (12) and (14).
4 Modeling zakat
This section describes three alternatives forms of preferences that capture the
motives for providing zakat. The key feature of zakat, as emphasized in the
discussion of Section 2, is that it is voluntary. An analysis of the consequences
of zakat therefore needs to model explicitly the motive for giving.
Section 2 identied the two reasons for giving that have been discussed in
previous literature. The rst explanation is that givers of zakat expect gratitude
in return. The idea of gratitude suggests that there is a utility payo¤from giving.
The closest existing model to this situation is that of warm-glow giving where
the size of donation enters as an argument of utility. The second explanation
is that zakat is provided because it is a religious commitment. In this case
there need not be any utility payo¤ from providing zakat. Instead, what can
support a religious commitment is the occurrence of a utility loss if the religious
commitment is not met. Such a loss can arise through feelings of guilt or shame
about not acting in the appropriate manner. It is precisely such feelings that
the social custom model has been designed to represent.
We now describe how we place these two forms of preferences, and a com-
bination of the two, into the overlapping generations economy described above.
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This involves a description of the preferences, the resulting decision problem,
and the characteristics of the population of rich consumers.
4.1 Warm-glow
The warm-glow model of giving assumes an act of charity delivers a private
utility payo¤. There are many potential explanations of what drives the pri-
vate payo¤. In the context of zakat it may be because of the observation of
the improved living standards of the poor, or from the feeling of pleasure at
fulllment of a religious obligation, or directly from the deriving pleasure from
the gratitude of recipients (where the recipient can be interpreted as the zakat
collector or the ultimate recipient of charity). For our modelling the source of
the warm glow is not too signicant; what matters for the current analysis is
the strength of the warm-glow and its implications for capital accumulation.
Before proceeding there are two points that should be noted in connection
with the warm-glow interpretation. First, it has been observed that there are
specied rates of zakat on di¤erent forms of wealth holding. This may seem
inconsistent with the warm-glow model. It should be stressed that since payment
is voluntary these rates have to be treated as guidance about the correct level
of payment rather than as the precise determinant of payment. The actual
payment can be less, or more, than the amount determined by the accepted
rate. Di¤erent religious interpretations also lead to di¤erent rates. Secondly,
the model we describe can be applied more generally as one of charitable giving
and, hence, can provide insight into how charity a¤ects capital accumulation.
The only special feature of the model is that we follow the practice of zakat by
insisting upon the charitable donations being transferred directly as payments to
the poor members of society. In a general model of charity it would be possible
to conceive of alternative uses of charitable funds.
The model of warm-glow giving is based on the utility function for the rich
Ur = U
 
xrt;t; x
r
t;t+1; zt+1

: (15)
The appearance of the zakat payment, zt+1; as an argument of utility represents
the warm-glow derived from giving to zakat. It is also assumed that all the rich
consumers have the same level of labor supply. This is xed at `r: Under this
assumption the characteristics vector for a rich consumer is  = `r and the type-
space is the single point  = f`rg : The utility function in (15) is maximized
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint
wt`
r = xrt;t +
xrt;t+1
1 + rt+1
+
zt+1
1 + rt+1
: (16)
With this model of warm-glow giving the level of zakat is a free choice variable.
4.2 Social custom
A second explanation of voluntary giving is that it arises as the outcome of a
social custom. The basic idea of a social custom is that those who do not act
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in the socially-approved manner su¤er a utility loss relative to those who do
act correctly (Myles and Naylor, 1996). If the population is heterogenous with
respect to the size of this utility loss then those for which it is large will abide
by the social custom whereas those for which it is small will not. This process
partitions the population, with the point of partition endogenously determined
in equilibrium.
This idea is now applied to zakat by assuming that the rich can choose
whether or not to provide zakat. If they choose not to provide then they su¤er
a loss of utility as a consequence of the social custom. The choice of whether
to provide is determined by comparing the utility obtained with no provision of
zakat (higher consumption but a loss through the social custom) to the utility
obtained when zakat is provided (lower consumption but no social custom loss).
Whichever of these utilities is larger determines the chosen action.
Each rich consumer is characterized by a value of the utility loss from break-
ing the social custom. Denote the utility loss from breaking the social custom
by . The assumption that all rich consumers have the same labor supply
is retained. The vector of characteristics describing a rich consumer is now
 = (`r; ) and the type-space is  = `r  ;  :
Consider rst the decision problem of a rich consumer who chooses to provide
zakat. It is assumed that if a consumer chooses to provide zakat then the
payment is made in accordance with the rules. If  is the rate of zakat on
wealth the optimization for a zakat payer is
max
fxrt;t;xrt;t+1g
U
 
xrt;t; x
r
t;t+1

s.t. wt`r = xrt;t +
xrt;t+1
[1 + rt+1] [1  ] : (17)
Denote the maximum value function for the optimization in (17) by Vz (wt; rt+1; ) :
The decision problem of a rich consumer who does not provide zakat is
max
fxrt;t;xrt;t+1g
U
 
xrt;t; x
r
t;t+1
   s.t. wt`r = xrt;t + xrt;t+11 + rt+1 : (18)
The maximum value function for the this optimization is denoted V0 (wt; rt+1) 
: Comparing the two maximum value functions, the consumer will provide
zakat if Vz (wt; rt+1; ) > V0 (wt; rt+1)  ; but not provide zakat otherwise.
For given values of wt, rt+1 and  there will be value t+1 at which
Vz (wt; rt+1; ) = V0 (wt; rt+1)  t+1: (19)
This value of t+1 partitions the population of the rich so that those with
 < t+1 do not pay zakat at time t+1 but those with  > 

t+1 pay zakat. Given
this partition of the rich, the levels of rst- and second-period consumption are
then determined by (17) for a zakat payer and (18) for a non-payer.
4.3 Combined model
The third representation of preferences combines the warm-glow and the social
custom models. The basic assumption is that the social custom utility is ob-
tained by providing the minimum required level of zakat. But, since the amount
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of zakat provided is voluntary, a warm-glow is obtained by paying in excess of
the minimum level.
For this representation of preferences the rich consumers di¤er in both the
value of the social custom utility loss and in the quantity of labor they can
provide. Since labor is measured in e¢ ciency units the variation in labor supply
among the rich can be attributed to skill di¤erences. Hence, each consumer is
characterized by a vector  = (`r; ) and the type-space is described by the set
 =

`r; `r
 ;  :
A rich consumer who does not provide zakat su¤ers a utility loss of  so the
level of utility is Ur = U
 
xrt;t; x
r
t;t+1
  ; with corresponding value function
V0 (wt; rt+1; `
r)    max
fxrt;t;xrt;t+1g
(
U
 
xrt;t; x
r
t;t+1
  
s.t. wt`r = xrt;t +
xrt;t+1
1+rt+1
)
(20)
The utility for a consumer who does provide zakat utility includes a warm glow
from providing in excess of the minimum; hence Ur = U
 
xrt;t; x
r
t;t+1

+ 
 
t+1

where zt+1 = t+1 + (1 + r)st: It is assumed that   (0) = 0 and  
0  t+1 > 0:
The value function when zakat is given is dened by
Vz (wt; rt+1; ; `
r) = max
fxrt;t;xrt;t+1;zt+1g
8><>:
U
 
xrt;t; x
r
t;t+1

+  
 
t+1

;
s.t. wt`r = xrt;t +
xrt;t+1+t+1
[1+rt+1][1 ] ;
t+1  0:
9>=>; :
(21)
If U
 
xrt;t; x
r
t;t+1

and  
 
t+1

are concave then t+1 is increasing in wt`
r
whenever it is strictly positive. Consequently, there is a value ^`r such that if
`r  ^`r then zt+1 = (1 + rt+1)st and if `r > ^`r then zt+1 > (1 + rt+1)st:
Rich consumers with labor supply above ^`r provide zakat above the minimum
(if they choose to provide at all) and benet from the warm-glow. The value of
^`r is independent of , so the attainment of the warm-glow is separate from the
decision on whether or not to provide.
For a given value of `r the critical value of the social custom utility loss is
dened by
Vz (wt; rt+1; ; `
r) = V0 (wt; rt+1; `
r)  : (22)
The right-hand side of (22) is linear in  and the left-hand side independent of
; so there exists a function  =  (`r) such that a rich consumer with labor
supply `r will provide zakat if  >  (`r) but will not provide otherwise. Notice
that for given  there need not be a unique solution in `r to (22): the equation
involves the intersections of two concave functions so that it is possible for them
to intersect multiple times. If  >  (`r) the level of zt+1 is determined by
the optimization program (21). Conversely, if    (`r) then consumption is
determined by the optimization program (20)
This reasoning implies that consumers with labor supply `r 2
h
`r; b`ri and
 >  (`r) will provide zakat equal to (1+rt+1)st and will obtain no warm-glow.
Those with labor supply `r 2
b`r; `ri and  >  (`r) will provide zakat to a level
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Figure 1: Division of population: warm glow and social custom
zt+1 > (1+rt+1)st and will derive a warm-glow: These results are summarized
in Figure 1 which illustrates the separation of the population. The key point
of the gure is that there need not be monotonicity in the relation between
 and `r. The aggregate values for the endogenous variables are computed
by integrating over the population taking into account the critical values that
separate the di¤erent behavior regions and, consequently, di¤erent consumption
demands and level of zakat provision.
5 Results
The consequences of the institution of zakat for capital accumulation and growth
in the overlapping generations economy are now investigated using a simulation
analysis. This emphasis is in line with the literature discussed in Section 1 that
has focused upon the question of whether zakat increases capital accumulation.
The simulations explore the three di¤erent forms of preferences and also contrast
zakat to standard wealth taxation.
The production function employed in all the simulations is f (kt) = kat ; with
a = 0:36. The other parameter values that remain constant are: `p = 0:1; and
nr = 0:05: The initial value of the capital-labor ratio is k0 = 0:01 and the initial
ratio of poor to rich is 0 = 0:05:
5.1 Warm-glow
The simulation of the warm-glow model is based on a Cobb-Douglas utility
function for the rich
Ur =

xrt;t
 
xrt;t+1

[zt+1]

; (23)
with parameters values +  +  = 0:75: All simulations have  = , so when
 is varied  and  are changed proportionately. The labor supply of the rich
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is xed at `r = 1 and the growth rate of the poor has parameter v = 1
The rst step is to determine the relationship between the growth rate of
output and the relative concern for giving zakat as measured by the value of .
The process used is to compute the mean growth rate of output per capita, gy;
for the rst ve generations.4 Table 3 shows that an increase in the concern for
zakat raises the growth rate of output. The basic mechanism behind this result is
clear: a greater concern for zakat increases saving so capital is accumulated more
quickly and output rises faster. But this is not full story since the population
structure is also changing. In this case, the proportion of poor does not grow
as fast the capital stock, so the output-labour ratio rises.
Table 3: Concern for zakat and the mean growth rate
 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
gy 8.019 8.294 8.554 8.798 9.029
The next step is to compare the steady-state level of the capital-labor ratio
and the proportion of poor to rich for di¤erent values of the preference for giving
zakat. The results are summarized in Table 4. It can be seen the steady-state
levels k and  increase with . Within the context of the model these results
demonstrate that the institution of zakat raises the steady-state value of the
capital-labor ratio. Not surprisingly, a greater concern for giving zakat leads to
more redistribution and permits a larger population of poor consumers to be
sustained.
Table 4: The steady-state
 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4
k 0.1724 0.1891 0.2062 0.2238 0.2418 0.2602 0.2789 0.2980
 0.0241 0.0484 0.0729 0.0976 0.1226 0.1480 0.1737 0.1997
To provide a point of comparison it is interesting to compare the proper-
ties identied for the economy with zakat as a warm-glow to an economy that
employs a traditional wealth tax to conduct redistribution. This seems an ap-
propriate comparison since zakat is often interpreted as a voluntary tax on
wealth. It is important to stress that the numerical values should not be com-
pared across the systems (since a like-for-like comparison cannot be uniquely
identied) but it is valid to compare the qualitative properties of the systems.
For the wealth tax the warm glow is no longer relevant so the adjustment
0 = + 2 ; 
0 =  + 2 is adopted and the Cobb-Douglas utility function used
without the warm-glow. The budget constraint for the wealth tax is
`rt;t = x
r
t;t +
xrt;t+1
(1 + rt+1) (1  ) ; (24)
so wealth accumulated is taxed at rate  in the second period of life. It is
assumed that the poor do not accumulate wealth, and that the tax revenue
4After ve generations the economy is close to its steady state where growth in per capita
output is zero unless there is exogenous technical progress. Interpreted literally, ve genera-
tions represents approximtely 125 years.
14
raised from the rich is used to fund a payment to the poor. This payment is
divided equally among all the poor.
Table 5 shows the steady-state values of the capital-labor ratio and the
growth of the proportion of poor to rich with the wealth tax. The interesting
feature is that the increase in tax rate reduces the steady state level of capital.
Hence, increasing the wealth tax to increase assistance to the poor reduces the
steady-state capital-labor ratio. This is the converse e¤ect to encouraging zakat
through a stronger warm-glow e¤ect. This result is explained by the fact that a
wish to give zakat encourages wealth to be accumulated whereas a wealth tax
discourages wealth accumulation.
Table 5: Wealth tax
 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4
k 0.1561 0.1559 0.1558 0.1557 0.1556 0.1555 0.1554 0.1553
 0.0046 0.0093 0.0139 0.0186 0.0232 0.0279 0.0326 0.0372
These results have demonstrated that with the warm-glow interpretation a
stronger institution of zakat increases the capital-labor ratio. Increased concern
for giving zakat can raise the growth rate of output and the steady-state levels
of the capital-labor ratio and the ratio of poor to rich. In contrast, increased
redistribution nanced by a wealth tax reduces the capital-labor ratio.
5.2 Social Custom
The social custom model provides a di¤erent motivation for providing zakat.
The central feature of this model is the utility loss from breaking the social
custom.
The simulation assumes a Cobb-Douglas utility function
Ur =

xrt;t
 
xrt;t+1

; (25)
with parameters  =  = 0:375: Each rich consumer is characterized by the
utility loss, , that they su¤er if the break the social custom. The utility loss
is assumed to be uniformly distributed on the interval [0; 0:1] : Other parameter
values are identical to those in the simulation of the warm-glow.
Table 6 shows the e¤ect of raising the rate of zakat, . The steady-state
capital-labor ratio is decreased as  increases but the quantitative size of the
e¤ect is very small. The proportion of the poor increases with . The proportion
of the rich that participate in the social custom is denoted by P . The e¤ect of
raising the rate of zakat is to reduce participation so that a higher value of 
results in a smaller proportion of the population providing zakat. This reduced
participation o¤sets the e¤ect of increasing  on the amount of zakat raised.
The mean growth rate is non-monotonic with respect to .
Table 6: Increasing the rate of zakat
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 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
k 0.1560 0.1558 0.1557 0.1556 0.1555 0.1555
 0.0080 0.0149 0.0205 0.0248 0.0277 0.0292
P  0.9342 0.8663 0.7959 0.7230 0.6471 0.5680
gy 6.436 6.435 6.434 6.434 6.434 6.435
This analysis of zakat as a social custom shows that participation in the
provision of zakat changes with the rate of zakat to leave the capital-labor ratio
barely a¤ected. With this formulation changing  has little e¤ect upon capital
accumulation. Hence, additional zakat can be obtained to redistribute to the
poor without unduly a¤ecting the capital-labor ratio. An increased rate of zakat
discourages participation despite the social custom.
5.3 Combined model
The results for the warm-glow model show that a greater concern for giving
zakat raises the steady-state level of the capital-labor ratio. Conversely, in the
social custom model an increase in the rate of zakat reduces (though not by
much) the steady-state capital-labor ratio. The alternative interpretations of
the motive for giving zakat therefore lead to di¤erent predictions. This provides
the motivation for considering a more general model that combines the two.
The simulation of the economy is based on a quasi-linear utility function for
rich consumers who contribute to zakat
Urt =

xrt;t
 
xrt;t+1

+ t+1; (26)
where t+1 is the contribution to zakat above the recommended level: A non-
contributor has t+1 = 0 and su¤ers a utility loss of : The minimum and
maximum values of labor supply are `r = 1 and `
r
= 10; and the upper and
lower values of the social custom are  = 0;  = 0:5: It is also assumed that
v = 2.
Table 7 details the e¤ect of increasing . The important observation is that
the capital-labor ratio is reduced as the rate of zakat increases. This conforms
with the outcome in the economy with just a social custom. The value of P 
decreases as the rate of zakat increases so there is less participation in the
provision of zakat. Despite this, the proportion of the poor increases. This is
the explanation for the capital-labor ratio falling as the rate of zakat increases.
The mean growth rate of output also falls as  increases.
Table 7: Increasing the rate of zakat ( = 0:15)
 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
k 0.1561 0.1560 0.1559 0.1559 0.1558 0.1557
 0.0234 0.0426 0.0609 0.0770 0.0908 0.1020
P  0.9648 0.9284 0.8905 0.8500 0.8097 0.7664
gy 7.815 7.801 7.789 7.777 7.763 7.749
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The nal simulation considers the e¤ect of increasing the utility obtained
from the warm-glow upon the capital-labor ratio. Table 8 shows that the steady-
state value of the capital-labor ratio falls as  increases. This di¤ers from the
result obtained from the economy with only the warm-glow. The reason for this
is the rapid increase in the the proportion of poor as more rich participate in
the social custom of zakat. Unlike the basic warm-glow model, an increase in 
reduces the mean growth rate of output.
Table 8: Enhancing the warm-glow ( = 0:2)
 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
k 0.1559 0.1559 0.1559 0.1549 0.1539 0.1533
 0.0589 0.0599 0.0609 0.2958 0.5275 0.6431
P  0.8684 0.8796 0.8905 0.9446 0.9832 0.9938
gy 7.7195 7.7194 7.789 7.769 7.732 7.713
The results of this section have been derived for an economy where the giving
of zakat involves both a warm-glow and a social custom. An increase in the rate
of zakat is met with a reduction in the participation in the social custom and an
increase in the proportion of the poor su¢ cient to reduce the capital-labor ratio.
In contrast, an increase in the concern for the warm-glow raises participation in
the social custom. The steady-state capital-labor ratio falls nonetheless due to
an increase in the proportion of the poor. These results show that the rate of
zakat can be raised without excessive damage to the capital-labor ratio and that
participation in zakat can be increased if e¤ort is devoted to emphasizing the
warm-glow. The e¤ect of both policies is to raise the relative level of support
given to the poor which increases the proportion of poor in the population.
6 Conclusions
The paper has considered the e¤ects of the institution of zakat on capital ac-
cumulation and growth. Zakat has been interpreted as a voluntary system
of redistribution supported by the concept of religious obligation. It has been
modeled as an alternative to redistribution nanced by statutory taxation. Two
alternative motivations for providing a voluntary payment of zakat have been
analyzed. The warm-glow assumes that zakat gives a private utility return. The
social custom assumes that there is a utility loss to not paying. These motives
for giving zakat have been embedded within an overlapping generations model
with heterogenous consumers and endogenous population growth.
With a warm glow the stronger is the preference for zakat the faster output
grows and the higher is the capital-labor ratio in the steady state. This provides
a sense in which the previous claims about zakat raising the capital stock are
correct. The results from the social custom model are somewhat di¤erent. In
this case a higher the rate of zakat slows growth and the lowers the steady
state capital-labor ratio. A higher rate also reduces participation in the social
custom. These results are modied in a model that combines both the warm
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glow of giving and the social custom. Both a stronger preference for the warm-
glow and an increase in the rate of zakat reduce the mean rate of growth and
the steady-state capital labor ratio but do achieve an increase in redistribution
and a consequent increase in the proportion of the poor in the population. This
variety of e¤ects makes clear that care must be taken with interpreting any claim
that the institution of zakat increases, or reduces, the capital stock. Since these
claims are based on simulation analysis they are obviously limited in generality.
However, the framework we have used has proved su¢ ciently exible to generate
an interesting range of outcomes.
The paper has explored two senses in which the question of a strengthening
of the institution of zakat can be interpreted. The results show that increasing
the perception of the warm-glow from providing zakat is more e¤ective than
raising the rate of zakat because an increase in rate reduces participation. In
addition, we would like to claim that the analysis has demonstrated that the
economic consequences of a religious obligation can be addressed by adapting
existing economic models. The warm-glow and the social custom can explain
voluntary contribution, and can be interpreted in terms that accord with the
basic religious roots of the institution of zakat.
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